Teaching AI Agent to Play Poker Strategically Through Preference Optimization
A poker agent can make a legal move and still make a strategically poor one. We ask whether compact AI agents can exhibit strategic behavior under hidden information and whether preference optimization can improve beyond static and zero-shot policies. We first evaluate a static baseline and three fr…
Authors: Phurinat Polasa , Thanapon Thanadunpremdet , Phatthanasak Kraiduang , Saksorn Ruangtanusak
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Abstract: A poker agent can make a legal move and still make a strategically poor one. We ask whether compact AI agents can exhibit strategic behavior under hidden information and whether preference optimization can improve beyond static and zero-shot policies. We first evaluate a static baseline and three frozen language models: SmallThinker, Qwen3, and Gemma-3 whose performance varies substantially between exact-game and six-player evaluation. We therefore propose Strategic Preference Optimization with KL-anchored Equilibrium (SPOKE), combining teacher-relative value penalties, policy anchoring, risk constraints, and structured rationale supervision, and compare it with SFT, DPO, GRPO, and GSPO. Across three runs of a SmallThinker-4B-A0.6B policy, SPOKE achieves the lowest mean exploitability in Kuhn (0.213) and Leduc (1.081) and the highest six-max top-1 agreement (0.775), while maintaining teacher KL comparable to SFT (0.522 vs 0.523). These results provide preliminary evidence that strategic preference optimization can improve strategic quality while preserving teacher-consistent behavior.
Comments:
IEEE iSAI-NLP SRW 2026
Subjects:
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ; Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as:
arXiv:2610.27028 [cs.AI]
(or
arXiv:2610.27028v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.27028
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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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From: Saksorn Ruangtanusak [ view email ]
[v1]
Mon, 19 Oct 2026 15:33:17 UTC (1,574 KB)
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