Spiking Neural Networks Are Harder to Steal: A Benchmark Study of Model Stealing Attacks

Authors: Ayana Moshruba , Maryam Parsa

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Abstract: Machine learning models deployed behind query interfaces expose more than their predictions, because an adversary can use those predictions to rebuild the model itself. Model stealing attacks (MSAs) exploit this exposure by training a surrogate model that replicates the decision behavior of a target through black-box queries alone, without access to its parameters or training data. These attacks are well characterized for conventional artificial neural networks (ANNs), yet spiking neural networks (SNNs) process information in a fundamentally different way. SNNs communicate through sparse, discrete spikes, and their outputs depend on membrane potentials that evolve over time rather than on a static mapping from input to output. This temporal mode of computation suggests that the decision behavior of an SNN may be harder to reconstruct from its responses. This work tests that possibility by benchmarking four representative MSAs, namely the Papernot, Tramèr, T-RND, and color perturbation attacks, against SNNs and their ANN counterparts on MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10. Across every attack and dataset, SNNs prove consistently more difficult to steal. Surrogates of SNNs achieve 10% to 20% lower agreement with the target model and 15% to 25% lower adversarial transferability than surrogates of ANNs. We attribute this resistance to the way SNNs compute, as their spike-based and time-dependent dynamics yield decision boundaries that ANN-based surrogates struggle to approximate, even under large query budgets. These findings extend the known resilience of SNNs beyond attacks on training data to the replication of model functionality, strengthening the case for neuromorphic architectures in security-sensitive applications.

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Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

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arXiv:2610.36298 [cs.AI]

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arXiv:2610.36298v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.36298

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arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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From: Ayana Moshruba [ view email ]

[v1]

Mon, 26 Oct 2026 21:24:08 UTC (261 KB)

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